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ZIGLAR V. ABBASI AND THE DECLINE 
OF THE RIGHT TO REDRESS 
Benjamin C. Zipursky* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a truism of American legal history that a political pendulum that 
swings far to one side will eventually swing just as far to the other.  At first 
blush, it appears that the Warren Court’s swing to the left is now being 
counterbalanced by the Roberts Court’s swing to the right, just as the Burger 
Court was in many ways counterbalanced by the Rehnquist Court.  Like most 
truisms, however, there is a great deal that is misleading and perhaps even 
false in such statements.  Obergefell v. Hodges,1 National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,2 King v. Burwell,3 Bank of America Corp. 
v. City of Miami,4 and numerous other decisions paint a far more complicated 
picture.  And some domains—like the First Amendment—are simply not 
well suited to the left/right characterization because “rights victories” are 
favored alternately by conservatives and progressives, depending on the 
context.5 
This Article turns to a domain of U.S. Supreme Court decision-making that 
is strikingly less politically ambiguous, displaying what really is a consistent 
and marked shift from Warren- and Burger-era thinking.  In a form that is 
concededly simplistic, I mark the shift by discussing the Supreme Court’s 
June 2017 decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi.6  Ziglar considers what could be 
called a textbook case of a constitutional tort, a case in which utterly innocent 
 
*  James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics and Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.  I 
am grateful to Fordham Law School, the Stein Center for Law and Ethics, and the Fordham 
Law Review for making this Colloquium (and this Article) possible.  John Goldberg, Amanda 
Gottlieb, Bruce Green, and Jules Lobel deserve special thanks.  This Article was prepared for 
the Colloquium entitled Access to Justice and the Legal Profession in an Era of Contracting 
Civil Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics 
on October 27, 2017, at Fordham University School of Law.   
 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 2. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
 3. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 4. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
 5. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down a federal law 
in an opinion by conservative Justices on free speech grounds with liberal Justices in dissent), 
with Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down a federal law in an opinion by 
predominantly left-wing Justices on free speech grounds with predominantly conservative 
Justices in dissent). 
 6. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
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Muslims had been thrown into brutal jails and had remained imprisoned 
simply because of their ethnicity, at the behest of Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller.7  In Ziglar, the Court found that 
there was no claim at all against these executive officers.8  Here, one sees 
that the pendulum has swung very far indeed from the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics,9 where the Court passionately recognized an 
individual’s claim in far less draconian circumstances.10 
The author of Ziglar, Justice Kennedy, is not properly treated as an 
emblem of the conservatism of the Roberts Court.  To the contrary, of course; 
he is an emblem of the middle, seemingly proving that there has not been a 
seismic shift on the Court.  And that, in part, is why the case is so telling.  
What it tells, I shall argue, is a change so deep and so dramatic that Ziglar’s 
denial of redress now seems milquetoast or middle ground. 
Bivens was, of course, a case about the Fourth Amendment and the right 
against government intrusion.11  It was also about the FBI, about the 
pioneering role of the U.S. Supreme Court, and about the prerogative of 
Justices to engage in judicial improvisation for reasons of justice.  For this 
Article, however, I shall not focus on any of those themes but on one that is 
concededly nearer and dearer to my own area of tort law and tort theory.  In 
this domain, Bivens is a case about implied rights of action for individuals 
seeking to hold accountable someone who wronged them.12  It stands for the 
maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium13 (where there is a right there is a remedy),14 a 
principle that Justice John Marshall ironically celebrated in Marbury v. 
Madison,15 standing alongside his recognition of the Court’s authority to 
engage in judicial review.  Bivens is about access to courts and access to 
justice.16  The near dismissal of Bivens in Ziglar manifests a much larger 
aspect of where the Supreme Court, like our legal culture more generally, has 
gone in its thinking about an individual’s right of redress. 
Part I briefly describes the facts of Ziglar, its journey through the federal 
courts, and the Court’s treatment of it.  Part II offers a commentary on Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Ziglar, focusing especially on his analysis of the 
reasons for and against recognizing a Bivens action and his choice to dispose 
 
 7. Id. at 1853. 
 8. Id. at 1860–61.  
 9. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
 10. Id. at 389 (describing the officers’ treatment of Bivens).  
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. at 397. 
 13. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). This case is one of the Supreme 
Court’s most famous statements of this maxim: 
“So, in every case, where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a 
person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his 
advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.”  
This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium.  
Id. at 39–40 (quoting Holt, C.J., Anonymous, 6 Mod. 26, 27).  
 14. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
 16. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402–04.  
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of the case through a Bivens framework.  I argue that his reasoning in Ziglar 
reflects an untenably narrow conception of the place of private rights of 
action in our legal system.  In this respect, Part III suggests that the atrophy 
of Bivens in the Supreme Court exemplifies a wide range of changes in the 
Court’s outlook on many aspects of litigation.  The Court’s decisions on 
standing, class actions, punitive damages, federal preemption, pleading, 
summary judgment, and immunities have all been deeply affected by a failure 
to take the basis of private rights of action seriously.  This skewed mindset 
largely came into place in the Rehnquist era and has thrived in the Roberts 
Court.  Part IV suggests that some aspects of this hostility to private rights of 
action have been absorbed by the bench and bar as a kind of centrist, 
pragmatic wisdom about what our court system can tolerate. 
I.  ZIGLAR V. ABBASI 
In Ziglar, the six plaintiffs were men of Arabic or South Asian descent, 
and five of the six were Muslim.17  They were detained and subjected to strip 
searches, beatings, and solitary confinement in American prisons for several 
months.18  The complaint alleges—and the federal government does not 
contest, for the purposes of this litigation—that they were rounded up as part 
of a group of hundreds of individuals arrested and imprisoned at the direction 
of the defendant Attorney General and head of the FBI.19  The criteria that 
led to the arrest and the detention were that the individuals were men of this 
ethnicity and religion who had overstayed their visas in the United States; 
eighty-four such persons were placed in the Metropolitan Detention Center 
in Brooklyn.20  The plaintiffs alleged due process, substantive due process, 
and equal protection violations (among others) under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments of the Constitution.21 
The litigation path that ended in Justice Kennedy’s Ziglar opinion was long 
and circuitous.  In 2009, the Supreme Court famously decided Ashcroft v. 
 
 17. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1853 (2017). 
 18. Id.  Indeed, the complaint contained the following allegations:   
Conditions in the Unit were harsh.  Pursuant to official Bureau of Prisons policy, 
detainees were held in “tiny cells for over 23 hours a day.”  Lights in the cells were 
left on 24 hours.  Detainees had little opportunity for exercise or recreation.  They 
were forbidden to keep anything in their cells, even basic hygiene products such as 
soap or a toothbrush.  When removed from the cells for any reason, they were 
shackled and escorted by four guards.  They were denied access to most forms of 
communication with the outside world.  And they were strip searched often—any 
time they were moved, as well as at random in their cells.   
Some of the harsh conditions in the Unit were not imposed pursuant to official 
policy.  According to the complaint, prison guards engaged in a pattern of “physical 
and verbal abuse.”  Guards allegedly slammed detainees into walls; twisted their 
arms, wrists, and fingers; broke their bones; referred to them as terrorists; threatened 
them with violence; subjected them to humiliating sexual comments; and insulted 
their religion. 
Id. (quoting Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 228 (2015)). 
 19. Id. at 1852.  
 20. Id. at 1852–53. 
 21. Id. at 1853–54.  
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Iqbal,22 which required the dismissal of this group of plaintiffs’ complaints; 
after the plaintiffs responded by filing amended complaints, some of those 
complaints were once again rejected under the stringent standards the 
Supreme Court had declared in its Iqbal decision.23  The plaintiffs in Ziglar, 
however, had managed to overcome the district court’s rejection of claims 
against the executive officials by a victory from a panel of the Second 
Circuit.24  Rehearing en banc was denied and the case went to the Supreme 
Court.25  Interestingly, two of the Justices—Sotomayor and Kagan—took no 
part in the decision, and Justice Gorsuch was not part of the Court.26  Justice 
Kennedy wrote for himself and three other Justices (Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito).27  In an opinion concurring in the 
judgment and concurring in all of the opinion except for the part that related 
to Warden Hasty’s qualified immunity, Justice Thomas opined that a more 
traditional, historically based conception of qualified immunity should be 
utilized.28  Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg dissented, put 
forward point-by-point bases for rejecting Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion.29 
The historical backdrop provided by Kennedy’s opinion turned out to be 
extremely important.  He began by observing that the Supreme Court has 
made clear in a series of cases over the past thirty years that Bivens is, in at 
least one crucial respect, not to be read broadly.30  In particular, the Bivens 
Court was to be interpreted as holding that a person like Webster Bivens, who 
was able to demonstrate that a particular kind of Fourth Amendment rights 
violation was committed against him, would have a private right of action 
against a federal agent who engaged in that rights violation.31  That holding 
might provide support for individuals alleging that a different kind of Fourth 
Amendment violation generates a private right of action, or even for 
individuals alleging that a different kind of individual rights violation by a 
federal actor generates a private right of action.  But it might not.  In any 
event, the case is not to be read as holding that individuals who can prove 
that their constitutional rights were violated by federal actors have a private 
right of action for damages.  That is far too broad.  Indeed, it is far too broad 
even if we qualify it by saying that, under Bivens, individuals who can prove 
that their constitutional rights were violated by federal actors have a private 
right of action for damages unless the federal actor falls under the shield of 
qualified immunity. 
 
 22. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 23. Id. at 666. 
 24. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1852.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 1869. 
 27. Id. at 1851.  Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence for part IV-B of the opinion.  
 28. Id. at 1869–72.  
 29. Id. at 1872–85.  
 30. Id. at 1856–57.  
 31. See id.; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 390 (1971).   
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Interestingly, Bivens is in this important sense treated a bit like an Article I 
font of lawmaking power for a branch of the federal government.  Because it 
(and those of its Supreme Court progeny that come out in favor of the 
plaintiff) are precedents, it seems, they provide authority for the Article III 
judiciary to craft private rights of action for different domains of individuals’ 
rights violations.  The question, in each new kind of Bivens claim asserted, is 
whether the judiciary should regard itself as properly exercising this power.32  
Justice Kennedy explained that Bivens stemmed from a time when the Court 
thought differently about implied rights of action in the statutory context: 
In the mid-20th century, the Court followed a different approach to 
recognizing implied causes of action than it follows now.  During this 
“ancien regime,” the Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to 
“provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective” a statute’s 
purpose.  Thus, as a routine matter with respect to statutes, the Court would 
imply causes of action not explicit in the statutory text itself. 
 . . . . 
 Later, the arguments for recognizing implied causes of action for 
damages began to lose their force.  In cases decided after Bivens, and after 
the statutory implied cause-of-action cases that Bivens itself relied upon, 
the Court adopted a far more cautious course before finding implied causes 
of action. . . .  [B]ut it cautioned that, where Congress “intends private 
litigants to have a cause of action,” the “far better course” is for Congress 
to confer that remedy in explicit terms.33 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ziglar comes into focus on this frankly 
restrictive view.  The question, in a previously uncovered kind of asserted 
Bivens claim, is whether the Court should extend Bivens to this kind of 
lawsuit.  In answering the question, Justice Kennedy declares, a key principle 
is “that a Bivens remedy will not be available if there are ‘special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’”34  
Indeed, the principle of restrictiveness is curiously doubled.  That is because 
Justice Kennedy’s Ziglar opinion holds that the scope of established Bivens 
contexts is itself to be read narrowly: 
Without endeavoring to create an exhaustive list of differences that are 
meaningful enough to make a given context a new one, some examples 
might prove instructive.  A case might differ in a meaningful way because 
of the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the 
generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial 
guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency 
 
 32. See, e.g., Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.  
 33. Id. at 1855 (citations omitted) (first quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 
(2001); then quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); and then quoting 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979)).  In depicting this era, Justice Kennedy 
drew from (and quoted) Professor Andrew Kent:  “In light of this interpretive framework, 
there was a possibility that ‘the Court would keep expanding Bivens until it became the 
substantial equivalent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” Id. (quoting Andrew Kent, Are Damages 
Different?:  Bivens and National Security, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1139–40 (2014)). 
 34. Id. at 1857 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)). 
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to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the 
officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into 
the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special 
factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.35 
In other words, nearly any kind of difference will create an obligation to 
consider “special factors.”36 
What are the special factors?  One is that high-level executive branch 
deliberations might be at issue.37  A second is that the executive branch was 
making policy.38  A third is that a Bivens claim against these officials would 
involve liability of some individuals for the acts of those who are lower down, 
which raises difficult questions of supervisory liability.39  Crucially, the 
Court notes that Congress has remained silent on the question of whether 
there should be private rights of action for those wrongfully detained.40  
Finally, because habeas review and injunctive relief may be available, this is 
not plausibly seen as a “damages or nothing” scenario.41  For all of these 
reasons, the Court declined to recognize a Bivens action.42 
The rejection of a Bivens claim against Ashcroft and Mueller is followed 
by a different treatment of a claim against prison warden Dennis Hasty.43  In 
light of the Court’s precedent in Carlson v. Green,44 which recognized Bivens 
claims against prison actors, it was hard for the Court to reject such claims 
here.  Yet, the Court did not reverse—it remanded.45  The lower courts are 
directed to ascertain, on remand, whether special factors counsel against the 
recognition of a Bivens claim in this new context.46 
As to a civil conspiracy action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Court held 
that there was qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald47 and 
Anderson v. Creighton.48  The Court’s basic reason for its decision in Ziglar 
was surprising, however.  The Court treaded on accepting an argument from 
the Ziglar defendants that there was no conspiracy claim at all because the 
alleged conspiracy was within workers of the same group and, thus, there was 
a single (corporate) person.49  Yet it stopped short of this analysis, preferring 
to utilize uncertainty about the progress of corporate-personality doctrine to 
say that the law of conspiracy for such high-level actors was unsettled under 
 
 35. Id. at 1859–60. 
 36. Id. at 1860. 
 37. Id. at 1860–61. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 1860.  
 40. Id. at 1860–61. 
 41. Id. at 1862 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971)).  
 42. Id. at 1860.  
 43. Id. at 1850. 
 44. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).  
 45. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1869. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see also id. at 818.  
 48. 483 U.S. 635 (1987); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012); Creighton, 483 U.S. at 646.  
 49. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1867. 
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Harlow and Anderson and that, therefore, there was qualified immunity.50  
The Court added an argument that the potential chilling effect of 
deliberations by high-level officials necessitates a finding of no liability in 
this instance.51 
II.  A PARTIAL CRITIQUE OF JUSTICE KENNEDY’S ZIGLAR OPINION 
In light of Iqbal, in light of the Court’s express hostility to Bivens over the 
past several decades, and in light of the height of the perch at which two of 
the defendants—Ashcroft and Mueller—sat, one could hardly say that the 
outcome in Ziglar was surprising.  On the contrary, it was entirely 
predictable.  Yet it is worth taking a moment to observe that the decision is 
in some ways quite shocking for several reasons. 
First, and perhaps foremost, nothing, or almost nothing, in Justice 
Kennedy’s decision turned on the noncitizen status of the plaintiffs.  It is 
entirely plausible that the American citizens who were rounded up, shackled, 
confined, and abused in this manner for months would have no right of 
redress.  In other words, our federal government can do this to its own 
citizenry without legal accountability. 
Second, there was a racial dimension to the roundup in Ziglar that is 
reminiscent of what occurred in Korematsu v. United States52 decades ago.  I 
had always thought and learned in school that Korematsu was a blot on our 
record as a nation of law and equality—not just for the federal actors but also 
for the Justices who failed to hold them accountable.  Now, we know that 
federal officials at the highest level are free from accountability in the courts 
if they do the same thing, and the Justices will still stay out.  The first and 
second points combine the notion that, while there is a difference in 
immigration status between the legally permissible plaintiffs (many of whom 
were citizens) in Korematsu and the impermissible ones in Ziglar, the Court 
did not rely upon the plaintiffs’ impermissible presence in the country to deny 
the availability of a Bivens action.53 
Third, the decision is not generated principally by traditional concerns 
about second-guessing the special high offices of the Attorney General and 
the FBI director.  Right or wrong, those would be considerations that go to 
the scope of immunity that is proper for officials so high.  Although the Court 
possibly left alive a Bivens claim against a much lower official—Warden 
Hasty—that was principally because of the kind of claim, not the status of 
the defendant.  Moreover, the Court showed its willingness on the § 1985 
 
 50. Id. at 1872. 
 51. Id. at 1868. 
 52. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
 53. Some might argue that the plausible existence of nonracial grounds for the 
permissibility of the initial arrest in Ziglar distinguishes it from the wholly racial seizure at 
issue in Korematsu, but this distinction provides little comfort.  To a substantial degree, it was 
the impermissible postarrest conduct that was at issue in Ziglar.  Moreover, it is unlikely that 
a special-factors analysis like that in Ziglar would have come out in favor of plaintiffs if 
applied to a Bivens action in a hypothetical Korematsu today. 
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conspiracy claim to utilize qualified immunity, but it did not in fact use 
qualified immunity.54  This means that the same conduct in the face of a 
recent Supreme Court opinion expressly rejecting the permissibility of such 
conduct still would not face liability.  There is no need for qualified immunity 
because there is simply no claim at all. 
Finally, the admittedly difficult separation of powers questions at issue in 
wartime cases cannot explain the Court’s decision.  That is because, as my 
colleague Andrew Kent has pointed out, the Court displayed its willingness 
to override the other branches in Boumediene v. Bush55 and other post-9/11 
cases.56 
Let me put my principal point in a more moderate and academic way:  The 
Supreme Court was unwilling to permit illegal aliens to recover damages 
personally from the Attorney General and the FBI director for their 
implementation of the U.S. government’s aggressive 9/11 policies.  A variety 
of political considerations render this decision unsurprising (e.g., a public 
sentiment of hostility to illegal aliens), and a variety of institutional 
considerations arguably render it somewhat defensible (e.g., the traditional 
deference of the Court to the executive branch on issues of national defense).  
But what is bracing is that neither the illegality of the plaintiffs’ presence in 
the United States nor the immunity of the executive actors proved central to 
the decision.  Nor, for that matter, did separation of powers concerns relating 
to the relationship between the judiciary and the executive branch. 
The words of Ziglar do convey a deep concern about separation of powers, 
but what drives his concern more than the Article II/Article III separation 
problem is the Article I/Article III separation problem.57  Justice Kennedy 
insists that Congress, not the courts, should be conferring remedies upon 
those aggrieved by constitutional wrongs.58  At one level, this is clearly 
disingenuous since we appear to be very far from a Congress that would 
confer such remedies.  It is fair to say, however, that Kennedy believes it is 
unduly activist for the Court to be finding implied rights of action in statutes 
or the Constitution.  Indeed, the structure of the opinion is that there will not 
be a new Bivens action in any but the most straightforward case, either 
covered clearly by the old Bivens action or presenting no difficult issues (or 
special factors).59 
I suggest that one of most important passages in the Ziglar case is this: 
During this “ancien regime” [of the 1960s,] the Court assumed it to be a 
proper judicial function to “provide such remedies as are necessary to make 
effective” a statute’s purpose.  Thus, as a routine matter with respect to 
statutes, the Court would imply causes of action not explicit in the statutory 
text itself. 
 
 54. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1868. 
 55. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
 56. Kent, supra note 33, at 1192–93. 
 57. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.  
 58. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858. 
 59. See id. 
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 . . . . 
 Later, the arguments for recognizing implied causes of action for 
damages began to lose their force.60 
Several facets of this passage jump off the page.  One is that what was 
plainly quite a progressive era is described as the “ancien regime,” without a 
hint of irony.  Another is that the Burger Court is described as having 
“assumed” providing remedies was a proper judicial function—as if the 
Court did not even think about it.  Thirdly, the reason for providing remedies 
was allegedly to render a statute’s “purpose” effective.  Purposivism has 
become a dirty word in statutory interpretation, at least among those attracted 
to Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence.  Finally, it is striking that Justice Kennedy 
used passive and descriptive language rather than active or normative 
language in flagging the problem of the Supreme Court when it was more 
inclined to recognize implied rights of action.  Later, the arguments for 
recognizing implied causes of action for damages began to lose their force.  
This is essentially saying that they became less popular among the Justices, 
not that the reasons for deeming them sound had been persuasively undercut. 
What is most interesting about this passage, however, is what is not said.  
There is no recognition in Justice Kennedy’s opinion that the core of Bivens 
is the core of Marbury v. Madison—the principle that where there is a right 
there is a remedy.61  Indeed, he characterizes the reasons behind the decision 
of courts to recognize private rights of action as reasons of pursuing statutory 
(or, in this case, constitutional) purposes.62 
My central contention is that the core of Ziglar is the Supreme Court’s 
neglect of the normative basis of the principle that “where there is a right 
there is remedy.”63  Justice Breyer begins his dissent with a substantial 
recognition of that fundamental principle within our system.64  The reasons 
for recognizing a right of action stem from the entitlement of the individuals 
whose rights were violated to demand redress from the violators.  The 
plaintiff in a Bivens claim is not a private attorney general trying to further 
the policies behind the Bill of Rights.  Nor is the plaintiff presenting himself 
principally as a person who has suffered concrete losses that require 
compensation, though that may well be true.  The plaintiff is seeking redress 
for a rights violation.65 
The point here is that it is a core mission of our courts to provide that 
redress and, in so doing, to empower the victims of such legal wrongs.  Once 
 
 60. Id. at 1855 (citations omitted) (first quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 
(2001); then quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)); see also supra note 33 
and accompanying text.   
 61. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 62. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1855.  
 63. The ubi jus principle is at the core of the civil recourse theory that I have developed 
along with Professor John Goldberg. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and 
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 84 (1998); supra note 13 and accompanying 
text.  See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:  Due Process 
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005).  
 64. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1872–73 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 1869.  
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one sees this principle as the core of recognition of Bivens claims, one is 
forced to confront the question whether it really is a congressional function 
in the first instance to recognize rights of redress.  Of course, there are 
positivistic and federalist reasons for supposing that the Article III judiciary 
should leave creation of private rights of action to Congress.  But note that it 
is not an atheoretical or normatively neutral point; on the face of it, this 
posture requires a substantial argument against the traditional position that 
the judiciary is in charge of whether to reject or accept private claims against 
wrongdoers who have injured individuals. 
III.  THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY 
Justice Kennedy’s abandonment of the notion that “where there is a right 
there is a remedy” in his Ziglar opinion is a vivid illustration of a great deal 
of what has happened in our Supreme Court and our legal culture.  Anyone 
who follows tort reform and litigation reform more generally knows that 
corporate America—like many factions in our society—has sought to 
influence a number of different sources of power in our legal system.  Most 
obviously, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in concert with defense lawyers 
and a range of manufacturers, has tried (with substantial success) to persuade 
the public that tort law was out of control.66  The next step has been, and 
continues to be, efforts to persuade state legislatures to change tort law and 
to make it much more difficult for plaintiffs to win, to diminish plaintiffs’ 
recovery in damages, to disincentivize lawsuits by disincentivizing plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, to enact statutes of repose, and so on.67  But that is not all.  They 
have also, over the past several decades, tried to get Congress to enact 
statutory protections for big product manufacturers—for example, the 
handgun industry.68  The airline (after 9/11) and childhood vaccine industries 
have had strong victories in Congress on tort reform. 
Many of the most successful efforts to shrink tort law have occurred in the 
Supreme Court.  In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court’s Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.69 decision in conjunction with Federal Rule of 
Evidence 70270 spurred states around the country to follow suit and to 
scrutinize expert witnesses with a fine-toothed comb.  Daubert and its 
progeny appear to have had a substantial impact in diminishing tort suits. 
In 1890, by interpreting the Eleventh Amendment in a nontextualist 
manner, the Court radically shut off lawsuits against states.71  In the 1990s, 
the Supreme Court got into the business of shearing down punitive damages 
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awards under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.72  In the late 
1990s, it interpreted Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure73 
narrowly and shut down a range of mass tort actions brought as class 
actions.74 
The twenty-first century has brought its own rather remarkable trends in 
narrowing a plaintiffs’ ability to go to court.  In civil procedure, the radical 
reconceptualization of pleading standards in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly75 
and Iqbal have in fact streamlined motions to dismiss and mounted 
impressive barriers to bringing civil cases at all.  In products liability law, the 
Court has generated an uneven but daunting stream of cases protecting 
manufacturers against state tort actions by inflating the doctrine of federal 
preemption.76  Surprisingly, six of the Justices left failure-to-warn claims 
against prescription drug manufacturers alive in Wyeth v. Levine77 in 2009 
and two subsequent decisions—Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing78 in 2011 and Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett79 in 2013—effectively declaring the end of 
products liability for generic drugs that cause injuries.  Similarly, tort claims 
against huge corporate entities have also been protected from plaintiff attack 
by a combination of cases, including the recent Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Superior Court80 decision and the Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 
v. Brown81 and Daimler AG v. Bauman82 decisions.  These cases form a 
doctrine that promises a radical curtailment of personal jurisdiction in mass 
tort cases. 
IV.  LITIGATION REFORM, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 
AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
It is no exaggeration to call these systematic curtailments of plaintiffs’ 
substantive and procedural rights an attack on access to justice.  It is also no 
epiphany.  Not just trial lawyers and consumer advocates but progressives in 
general have railed against this onslaught.83 
I want to conclude, however, by offering a few observations that cast these 
issues in a different light, and to do so in a manner that connects them, 
especially when thinking about the bench and the bar.  Justice Kennedy is in 
some ways known as a judicial moderate, although many of his business 
decisions lean right and many of his personal liberty decisions lean left.  And 
much of his now remarkable corpus appears to be centrist.  It is quite natural 
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to regard several of the issues I have just enumerated—punitive damages, 
class actions, Daubert, pleading—as issues that have political consequences 
but that are intrinsically nonpolitical.  Even if that is not quite right, it is 
nonetheless plausible that a judge staking out positions on such issues might 
himself or herself aspire to be quite apolitical.  We know that is true of Justice 
Kennedy and that he seeks the middle. 
Justice Kennedy’s effort to take the middle road in Ziglar provides a lens 
through which to view his decisions on all of these cases.  In these decisions, 
as in his decision in Ziglar, he appears to maintain a self-conception as a 
reasonable and moderate justice.  One might say that it takes a good deal of 
self-discipline to take the putative rights invasions in Ziglar seriously and 
then decline to recognize a Bivens claim.  And one gets the feeling that Justice 
Kennedy regarded such (putative) self-discipline as foundational to his 
judicial role—as if actually recognizing the Bivens claim rather than 
deferring to Congress was the kind of activism the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts have learned to overcome. 
Two worries arise from this line of thought.  My first worry is that Justice 
Kennedy is representative of the bench more generally and that the 
curtailment of the right to redress—not necessarily in restricting Bivens 
actions particularly but in the array of domains I enumerated—is deemed to 
be a relatively middle-of-the-road, sensible kind of gatekeeping. 
My second worry is that the organized bar, such as it is, displays a similar 
overall outlook.  The legal profession today is sensitive to the question 
whether our society has too much litigation and too much liability.  I have 
little doubt that it is appropriate that we, the legal profession, be sensitive to 
these concerns.  But there are different kinds of sensitivities and different 
ways of framing the relevant issues, and I worry that we have been narrow-
minded in doing so.  What masquerades as a kind of pragmatic wisdom about 
what our court system and our other institutions can tolerate is really a 
particular sort of political position that should greatly concern us. 
One could, in theory, distinguish between two different sorts of evaluative 
criteria in appraising litigation reform.  Some of the criteria pertain to the 
substantive goals of an area of the law while others pertain to substantive 
normative constraints on it.  One could identify deterrence and compensation 
as goals of tort law, for example, but one might also identify as constraints 
that we want our system not to cost too much for the courts or for those who 
sustain liability, and we rightly examine the potential for interference with 
various institutions, such as the market or other branches of government.  The 
same could be said of related areas of law; for example, securities and civil 
rights. 
In my view, the bench and bar have overwhelmingly occupied what might 
be called a public law perspective on litigation reform—certainly, this is true 
of tort reform.  The criteria I laid out above are almost entirely public 
oriented.  But there is a private law way of looking at it too.  Providing private 
rights of action to individuals is a means to an end, but it is not just a means 
to an end.  It is also a way of allocating private power.  The right to redress 
is a legal power in our system, one that exists because the judiciary itself is a 
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font of legal power and, under the political norms of our constitutional 
system, is obligated to provide that power to private individuals under various 
circumstances.  “Where there’s a right, there’s a remedy”—what Justice 
Kennedy left out of his Ziglar opinion and Justice Breyer highlighted—is a 
norm governing courts.  It is an understatement to say they must bear it in 
mind. 
CONCLUSION 
After all this doom and gloom, I want to end on a more positive note—the 
positive note that led me to organize this Colloquium.  The access-to-justice 
movement is probably a movement from the left more than from the right.  
But, as my Fordham colleagues’ events and a growing series of developments 
around the country have indicated, it has come to develop support from 
across the political spectrum, certainly within the bench.  Fortunately, it 
emphasizes what I would describe (from within my admittedly peculiar 
perspective) as private law criteria for litigation reform:  it is about the extent 
to which individuals are empowered through our courts.  As my frequent 
collaborator, John Goldberg, and I have been arguing over the past two 
decades, a right to redress is a fundamental equality norm within our political 
system.  While the bench and the bar are certainly obligated to be vigilant of 
the practical workability of our litigation system and of its potential excesses, 
we are also in charge of securing compliance with that equality norm. 
 
